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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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June 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM CASEY
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Prime Minister
Begin, Monday, June 21, 1982

As you know, the President's meeting with Prime Minister Begin on Monday, June 21, may well be one of the most important of his Administration. Our relations with Israel and the Arab world are at a critical juncture. Despite the appalling bloodshed in the Lebanon and the fact that our overtures of the past year to the Israeli government have been ignored, we must now consider how to emerge from this tragedy in a position to improve our relations with both Israel and the Arabs and to restore order in Lebanon and advance the peace process.

In parallel, there are some longstanding bilateral issues between Israel and the United States that need to be laid out for Prime Minister Begin. It was the President's intention to do this prior to the recent Lebanese invasion as part of a new phase of U.S.-Israeli relations following the completion of the withdrawal from the Sinai on April 25.

For these reasons, I would like to solicit your personal views on the following list of topics so that the President can be assured that your views are taken into account as we prepare for the Monday meeting and our subsequent political, military and economic relations with Israel and the Arab world.

- 1) In principle, do you believe that U.S. forces should participate in a peacekeeping force in Lebanon? Why/why not?
- 2) Do you believe that we should link our willingness to assist in Lebanon -- politically, militarily and economically -- to Israeli concessions; for example, their acquiescence to arms sales to moderate Arab states and in the autonomy negotiations

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and relaxation of Israeli occupation policies in the West Bank and Gaza? Alternatively, do you believe that we should seek concessions from the Israelis through condemnation, the imposition of sanctions, and other types of negative inducements? What Israeli concessions would you propose we seek?

- 3) Should we continue a "business as usual" approach to our security assistance relationship? Specifically, should formal notification of the F-16 sale go to the Congress or be delayed? What about Israeli requests for ammunition and spare parts?
- 4) How should we handle the Israelis on the question of arms sales to Jordan?
- 5) Should we continue to follow our current posture in the UN?
- 6) Do you believe that we should undertake additional humanitarian relief efforts? If so, what do you propose?
- 7) Should we coordinate political efforts more closely with our Allies?

I would appreciate your comments, preferably limited to two pages, by no later than 1600 Friday, June 18, 1982.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

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